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Abstract
We study the degree of individual and aggregate market overreaction in a dynamic experimental
auction market. In 13 sessions with overall 101 students we find overreaction to new information
both in stock price forecasts and transaction prices. Interestingly, market forces do not seem to help
in lowering overreaction to new information in our setting. Moreover, we illustrate that subjects are
not able to learn from their previous failures and thus do not correct their erroneous beliefs. Hence,
overreaction in our setting remains on a stable level although subjects can at least in theory learn
from other market participants or from outcome feedback. Lastly, we find first experimental evidence
for a positive relation between differences of opinion and trading volume in a continuous auction
market with several market participants.
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1 Introduction
Behavioral finance shows that individual biases such as the disposition effect (Odean
(1998a) and Weber and Camerer (1998)), hindsight bias (Biais and Weber (2009)) or
overconfidence (Camerer and Lovallo (1999) and Biais et al. (2005)) can affect individual
decision making. In addition, both theoretical and experimental behavioral studies argue
that markets are not always fully efficient and that market forces are not fully able to
correct for individual biases (see e.g. Camerer (1987), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), or
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)). However, it is still ambiguous whether and why individual
biases prevail in market outcomes and if rational explanations are more capable to explain
some market anomalies. Some studies for example show that individual biases vanish
totally or are significantly reduced by market forces whereas other studies illustrate that
individual biases remain fairly stable or even get more pronounced on an aggregate level.
On the one hand, analyzing abstract Bayesian updating tasks Camerer (1987) and Gan-
guly et al. (1994 and 2000) show that probability judgment errors or biases can indeed
persist in market settings. However, they show that the bias on an aggregate level is
reduced. In a similar vein, Camerer et al. (1989) analyzing the hindsight bias, Kluger
and Wyatt (2000) studying judgment errors in the Monty Hall problem, and Sonnemann
et al. (2008) analyzing partition-dependence, show that market experience mitigates the
respective bias but is not able to eliminate it completely. On the other hand, Gillette et al.
(1999), Bloomfield et al. (2000), and Nelson et al. (2001) find that underreaction to sig-
nals in a coin-spin scenario shows the same extent in markets and on an individual level.
Similarly, Seybert and Bloomfield (2009) find hardly any evidence for a wishful thinking
bias on an individual level but strong evidence for wishful betting on an aggregate market
level.
In addition, van Boven et al. (2003) and Weber and Welfens (2007) show that a bias gets
smaller over repeated interactions of the same commodity or in the course of a trading
round but that this learning does not generalize to interactions with a new asset or com-
modity. Budescu and Maciejovsky (2005) conclude that “expecting biases to disappear
completely or, alternatively, to always persist are overly simplistic positions”. Overall,
findings in the literature indicate that the question whether markets can correct for in-
2
dividual biases depends on the structure of the market, the task on hand, the sort of
feedback that subjects receive or the individual bias that is analyzed.
The main goal of this paper is to analyze whether individual over- or underreaction to
changes in the fundamental value of a stock, i.e. to new information, affects market out-
comes in a setting similar to the one empirically analyzed by Thomas and Zhang (2008).
Thomas and Zhang (2008) study market reactions to earnings announcements by con-
sidering pairs of stocks from the same industry which announce earnings sequentially.
More precisely, they show that the market price of a firm that has not yet announced
earnings moves too far upward (downward) in reaction to good (bad) earnings reports of
an early-announcing peer and is corrected when the late-announcing firm’s earnings are
subsequently revealed. Thus, their findings suggest that stock prices for the late announc-
ers overreact to the information transfer from the early-announcing peer. Overreaction
(underreaction) in this context means that subjects put too much (little) weight on new
information. However, using empirical data it is not possible to rule out other explana-
tions for misreaction or to analyze in more detail, how individuals react to new information
about the fundamental value of a stock and whether this individual misreaction affects
market variables. Misreaction in this context is simply defined as the absolute level of
over- or underreaction.
Since the empirical and experimental evidence on how individual misreaction affects mar-
ket outcomes is scarce, we apply the individual level approach of Biais et al. (2008) that
analyzes how individuals process new information to an experimental trading market. The
main features of our design are as follows: first, we give subjects the stock price charts of
two related stocks (G and H) for the last six months and ask them to estimate the price of
one of the two stocks (H) in six months. After having provided a best estimate for stock
H subjects are able to trade this stock for two minutes in a single-unit open-book double
auction market. After two minutes of trading the subjects receive additional information
about the other stock (G) and are asked to update their estimates regarding the price of
stock H in six months. Subsequently, subjects get the possibility to trade stock H in a
single-unit open-book double auction market again for two minutes. Overall, each subject
trades in 8 of these experimental rounds, consisting of two trading periods of 120 seconds
and two estimation tasks.
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This experimental design allows us to relate individual level overreaction to market level
overreaction in an almost realistic setting, similar to the one in Thomas and Zhang (2008).
However, in contrast to their empirical approach we are able to explicitly calculate the
rational benchmark, and thus can rule out that risk or market microstructure effects
drive results on overreaction in markets. Moreover, using this clean design we are able
to quantify the exact degree of overreaction both on an individual and market level, and
thus can compare findings in the individual-level-study by Biais et al. (2008) with the
aggregate level study by Thomas and Zhang (2008).
Previous empirical and experimental evidence on the relation between individual level
misreaction and its effect on market parameters is scarce. On the one hand, most experi-
mental studies investigate the level of overreaction or underreaction on an individual level
(see e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Griffin and Tversky (1992), Bloomfield and Hales
(2002), Offerman and Sonnemans (2004), and Biais et al. (2008)). On the other hand, em-
pirical studies are mostly providing evidence for aggregate market overreaction (see e.g.
DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 1987, and 1990)), Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006), and
Thomas and Zhang (2008)). Evidence on the question how individual misreaction to new
information translates into market outcomes is scarce (see for notable exceptions Gillette
et al. (1999), Bloomfield et al. (2000), and Nelson et al. (2001)) and relies almost exclu-
sively on the classical Griffin and Tversky (1992) coin-spin scenario where subjects need
to indicate if a coin is heads- or tail-biased.
Our main findings can be summarized as follows: we observe strong and persistent over-
reaction for individual estimates as well as for market prices following both - good and
bad news. The level of overreaction in estimates is in the same range as in the individ-
ual experiment by Biais et al. (2008). Interestingly, aggregate overreaction in transaction
prices is not substantially lower. Thus, market forces are not able to correct for individual
biases which is in line with experimental findings in Gillette et al. (1999) who show that
underreaction in their experiment is even slightly higher in markets than on an individual
level. Moreover, our finding that overreaction does prevail in markets is also consistent
with behavioral models arguing that individual biases affect market outcomes (Odean
(1998b), Sorescu and Subrahmanyam (2006), and Biais et al. (2005)). In addition, we
provide evidence that learning effects within a 120-second trading period and learning ef-
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fects over the course of the experiment are hardly observable. Lastly, up to our knowledge
our study is the first to find experimental evidence for the theoretically proposed positive
relation between differences of opinion and trading volume (Varian (1989), Harris and
Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995)) in experimental markets with more than
two traders.
In the next section we review the related literature on misreaction and their impact on
market factors and form our hypotheses. Section 3 presents our experimental design and
procedure as well as some descriptive statistics. The main results of our study are reported
in section 4. Section 5 concludes with a short discussion of our findings and an outlook
for future research.
2 Related Literature and Hypotheses
2.1 Related Literature
The study by Biais et al. (2008) offers direct experimental evidence on the relationship
between information signals, beliefs, and financial decisions. Using a novel experimental
design in which subjects are asked to estimate the future price of an asset, incorporating
the stock price development of a related asset as information signal, the study has three
main findings: first, in this experimental environment a substantial level of overreaction
seems to exist which is in line with findings in Griffin and Tversky (1992) on an indi-
vidual level and Thomas and Zhang (2008) on an aggregate level. Second, analyzing the
relation between individual overreaction and psychological biases the authors show that
more overconfident subjects tend to overreact more heavily. Third, the authors show that
individual overreaction has an impact on financial variables such as portfolio risk and
portfolio efficiency.
However, it is not clear whether overreaction on an individual level translates to overre-
action in a market setting. Proponents of rational approaches often argue that just a few
rational subjects are sufficient to make market outcomes rational, that random mistakes
cancel out or that in the long run less rational subjects learn from more rational subjects
in the market (for further comments on this debate see Camerer (1987)). In the following,
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we will first review the theoretical literature on individual and market overreaction and
then illustrate existing empirical and experimental evidence on this issue.1
Theoretical models
Using various behavioral biases such as overconfidence or hindsight many behavioral mod-
els argue that individual overreaction has a substantial impact on market variables.2
Amongst others, Daniel et al. (1998 and 2001), Odean (1998b), and Fischer and Verrec-
chia (1999) model financial markets with overconfident individuals. These overconfident
individuals overweight the precision and overestimate the quality of a private signal that
they receive. This directly results in an individual overreaction to the signal. Consequences
of this individual overreaction are the wrong assessment of means, a more aggressive trad-
ing behavior, and a poor portfolio diversification. How exactly this individual overreaction
affects market variables depends on the information structure of the market and on the
proportion of overconfident investors in the market. However, almost all studies show
that individual overreaction of some investors results in aggregate, market overreaction
and has substantial effects on market demand and market prices.
In a similar vein, Biais and Weber (2007) theoretically show that hindsight biased agents
overreact to new information and put too much weight on a private signal. The intuition
behind is that hindsight biased agents incorrectly remember their prior expectations,
and thus overweight the informational content of new information. In their CAPM-like
framework individual overreaction of hindsight biased agents affects equilibrium prices
and holdings.
A third strand of literature tries to reconcile two patterns that seem contradictory: the
representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973) and the conservatism bias
(Edwards, 1968). Griffin and Tversky (1992) argue that subjects focus too much on the
strength of a new information, i.e. the degree to which it is favorable, and not enough on
its weight, i.e. its statistical reliability. They use the evaluation of recommendation letters
1We have argued in section 1 that the question whether individual biases can be corrected by market forces seems to
depend amongst others on the bias that is analyzed. Since we analyze over- or underreaction to new information we will
only illustrate studies analyzing this sort of bias.
2In addition, Grinblatt and Han (2005) show that individual underreaction caused by behaviorally affected traders has
also an influence on market prices in the equilibrium
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as an example. Here the strength refers to how positive or warm the letter’s content is and
the weight refers to the credibility and knowledge of the writer. They argue that the rep-
resentativeness heuristic and hence overreaction to new information prevails in situations
in which subjects receive new information which is characterized by high strength and low
weight. In the recommendation letter example this corresponds to a very nice recommen-
dation letter from a person with low credibility. Barberis et al. (1998) and Sorescu and
Subrahmanyam (2006) develop theoretical models that extend these findings and implica-
tions to financial markets. In line with the proposition in Griffin and Tversky (1992) both
studies propose that individual overreaction is present in situations that are characterized
by high strength and low weight and affects aggregate market prices and overall demand.
Empirical and experimental evidence
Although most behavioral models argue that individual overreaction automatically im-
pacts market variables and does not cancel out in the aggregate, the experimental and
empirical evidence on this issue is not unequivocal. Most empirical and experimental stud-
ies analyze either the level of overreaction on an individual level or on an aggregate level
but not simultaneously. In the following we will first review selected studies analyzing
individual overreaction before we document findings in the literature on aggregate mar-
ket overreaction. In the end we will present some of the very few studies analyzing both
individual and aggregate market overreaction.3
In one of the first experimental studies on overreaction Kahneman and Tversky (1973)
show that subjects tend to put too much weight on meaningless and practically irrelevant
information. Another strand of the literature uses the so called coin-spin design to detect
over- or underreaction on an individual level (see Griffin and Tversky, 1992). In this design
subjects know that the coin that is going to be spun is either heads- or tails-biased with a
prior probability of 0.5. After having observed a specific number of spins subjects are asked
to report an updated probability conditional on the observed signal which is simply the
number of heads and tails in the conducted spins. Findings in Griffin and Tversky (1992),
Offerman and Sonnemans (2004), and Massey and Wu (2005) confirm that individual
3Since the study of Biais et al. (2008) has shown that overreaction should be prevalent in our experimental setting as
the signal seems to be of relatively low weight and high strength we will only list a few exemplary studies finding empirical
or experimental evidence for underreaction: Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Hong et al. (2000), and Weber and Welfens
(2007).
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overreaction is present if subjects receive information with relatively high strength and
low weight. A different kind of test of individual overreaction to new information has been
carried out by Bloomfield and Hales (2002). They test the predictions in the theoretical
model of Barberis et al. (1998) in a simple experimental environment in which subjects
have to predict the next step of a random walk. They find substantial levels of individual
overreaction in this setting.
The overreaction phenomenon on the aggregate market level has also been amply docu-
mented in the empirical literature. DeBondt and Thaler (1985 and 1987) find that past
winners tend to be future losers and vice versa which they interpret as evidence for over-
reaction. Analyzing the price reaction to analysts’ forecast revisions Sorescu and Sub-
rahmanyam (2006) find evidence for the strength and weight hypothesis by Griffin and
Tversky (1992). Using an analyst’s ability and experience as a proxy for the weight of a
signal and the dramatic nature of an event, i.e. the level of a down- or upgrade, as a proxy
for the strength of a signal they test the hypotheses in Griffin and Tversky (1992). Con-
sistent with their hypothesis, they show that for signals with relatively high strength and
low weight market prices tend to overreact. Their results imply aggregate overreaction for
large down- or upgrades (high strength) by inexperienced analysts from investment banks
with a relatively bad reputation (low weight). The study by Thomas and Zhang (2008)
which resembles our experimental design the best also finds evidence for overreaction on
a market level. Analyzing subsequent earnings announcements by different firms from the
same industry they document that both the price of an announcing firm and the price
of a non-announcing firm from the same industry move in the same direction. However,
this price response of the non-announcing firm is negatively related to its price response
when it subsequently announces earnings. This result indicates that prices for subsequent
announcers overreact to an early announcer’s earnings and are corrected later on.
As mentioned above the empirical and experimental findings on overreaction on both -
individual and aggregate level - are scarce. Using a security markets task that is closely
related to the previously described coin-spin scenarios Bloomfield et al. (2000) and Nel-
son et al. (2001) document that individual misreaction, i.e. misreaction in stock forecasts,
also translates into aggregate misreaction, i.e. misreaction in prices. However, their anal-
yses show that underreaction in prices and forecasts is approximately the same whereas
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overreaction is significantly larger in stock forecasts than in prices. Both studies use a
clearinghouse market where all three individuals’ in a market have to choose a linear
demand schedule by setting a reservation price and a slope. Market clearing prices are
determined by a computer and set such that demand equals supply in the three person
economy.
Moreover, Hommes et al. (2005) find evidence for individual and aggregate overreaction
in an experimental prediction market. In their setting market prices are generated by an
asset pricing model with heterogenous beliefs. More specifically, in this design a computer
determines market prices by taking the average beliefs of all market participants and
adding some extra noise term. The authors find that in 8 out of 10 markets individual
overreaction results in aggregate overreaction.
In another experimental asset market, Gillette et al. (1999) give participants public in-
formation about the liquidating dividend of an asset in every third trading period. They
use both double-continuous auction markets and call markets with trading periods of 120
seconds. The trading structure of their market closely resembles ours. Their main results
show that underreaction in forecasts is even larger than underreaction in market prices
indicating that the standard argument that individual mistakes will cancel out and in-
dividual misreaction will be corrected by market forces does not need to apply to these
kind of asset markets.
2.2 Hypotheses
Biais et al. (2008) analyze a similar setting in a static environment with no trading market
and no feedback. Consistent with their findings, we expect that after observing a good
signal subjects state expectations that are higher than the fundamental value and after
observing a bad signal expectations that are lower than the fundamental value. As they
put too much weight on these signals subjects are expected to overreact in their stock
forecasts.
Moreover, we hypothesize that the results with regard to market prices should resemble
empirical findings in Thomas and Zhang (2008). They analyze aggregate overreaction in
prices in a dynamic empirical setting that is very similar to ours. Their main finding is
9
that stock prices for a late announcing firm overreact to the information signal inherent
in the early announcer’s earnings and that this overreaction is not corrected till the late
announcing firm reveals its earnings. Thus, in our design we should observe that prices
for a firm should overreact to information or signals about a related firm in the same
industry.
Furthermore, in agreement with Gillette et al. (1999) and Nelson et al. (2001) we assume
that misreaction (i.e. the absolute value of over- or underreaction) in market prices is not
substantially smaller than misreaction in individual forecasts as individual biases are not
corrected by market forces. Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c capture these intuitions.
Hypothesis 1a: Subjects tend to overreact to new information about related
stocks when submitting stock forecasts.
Hypothesis 1b: Market prices tend to overreact to new information about
related stocks.
Hypothesis 1c: Misreaction in market prices is not lower than misreaction in
stock forecasts.
Besides analyzing how individuals process new information and how market prices react
to new information we want to analyze the effects of overreaction in the long run. If
overreaction in our experimental setting is a systematic bias then it should not diminish,
even though subjects have the possibility to learn from the past and to acquire experience.
Stable levels of overreaction over the course of the 120 seconds of a trading round imply
that less rational subjects are not able to learn from the actions of more rational subjects.
Moreover, we argue that there is no learning effect over various rounds. The level of
overreaction in the first few rounds is not significantly larger than the level of overreaction
in the later rounds.
The view that overreaction does not vanish with the course of the experiment is consistent
with findings in Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) who show that overreaction in the coin-
spin scenario does not disappear even if subjects are trained and have more experience
with the task at hand.
Furthermore, psychological evidence indicates that outcome feedback is not as efficient at
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lowering biases as other forms of feedback such as cognitive or task information feedback
(see e.g. Benson and O¨nkal, 1992 or Goodwin et al., 2004). Since outcome feedback is the
major feedback subjects receive in financial markets and in order to keep our design as
realistic as possible we restrict our feedback to simple outcome feedback. Moreover, most
other studies analyzing whether individual biases are corrected by market forces also only
give subjects outcome feedback.
Consistent with findings in Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) who also analyze the role of
overreaction in a dynamic setting we propose the following three learning hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Learning within a round: Overreaction in stock prices remains
stable in the course of a round.
Hypothesis 2b: Learning over rounds: Overreaction in stock forecasts does not
diminish over the course of the experiment.
Hypothesis 2c: Learning over rounds: Overreaction in stock prices does not
diminish over the course of the experiment.
In addition to analyzing the level of individual and market overreaction in an experi-
mental asset market our design allows us to test further insights from theoretical models.
According to Milgrom and Stokey (1982) even in the wake of new private information no
trade should occur if agents have rational expectations. However, Varian (1989) argues
that trade can be triggered by heterogenous beliefs of market participants. These het-
erogenous beliefs or differences in opinion appear if subjects have differing prior beliefs
and/or if subjects interpret new public information differently. Related to this Harris and
Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson (1995) show that in speculative markets differences
of opinion can explain observed high levels of trading volume. In a similar vein, Cao and
Ou-Yang (2009) show that differences of opinion or disagreement about the mean of new
information has an impact on trading volume in stocks but does not affect trading volume
in options. All models on differences of opinion have one thing in common: the straightfor-
ward implication that trading volume is higher the more heterogenous the traders’ beliefs
are.
Empirical and experimental evidence on the relation between differences of opinion and
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trading volume is scarce but seems to confirm the theoretical models. Antweiler and Frank
(2004) analyze the effect of Internet stock message boards on trading volume in stock mar-
kets. Comparing the level of disagreement in these messages with trading volume they find
evidence for the theoretical propositions. Other studies in the accounting literature (see
e.g. Bamber et al, 1997) support this view and show that trading volume around earnings
announcements is related to different aspects of disagreement among agents. Furthermore,
Hales (2009) shows experimentally that subjects in a 2-person economy trade more ag-
gressively if they receive more diverging signals. He argues that this aggressive trading
volume can be reduced if subjects are not asked to forecast the value of a stock but
the level of disagreement between agents in an economy. Hypothesis 3 captures the main
intuition of the differences of opinion literature
Hypothesis 3: Trading volume is higher if subjects in a market have more
differences of opinion, i.e. more diverging expectations.
3 Experimental Design and Procedure
3.1 Theoretical Framework
Similar to the framework in Biais et al. (2008) subjects in our study observe a signal (s˜)
about the price of a stock (v˜). Since the signal is noisy it can be decomposed as follows:
s˜ = v˜ + e˜.
In our experimental setup subjects know that all random variables are identically, jointly
normal, and independently distributed. Thus, using the projection theorem we can calcu-
late the rational Bayesian benchmark:
E(v˜|s) = E(v˜) + cov(v˜, s˜)
var(s˜)
(s− E(s˜)) = E(v˜) + δ(s− E(s˜)). (1)
δ which is equal to cov(v˜,s˜)
var(s˜)
corresponds to the level of overreaction in this design. Thus,
subjects who overweight the informational content of a signal will overestimate δ and
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submit a biased forecast:
F = Eˆ(v˜|s) = E(v˜) + δˆ(s− E(s˜)), (2)




s− E(s˜) = δˆ − δ. (3)
If δˆ > δ we observe overreaction as a subject’s forecast to a surprisingly good signal is
larger than the conditional expectation (F > E(v˜|s)) and smaller than the conditional
expectation (F < E(v˜|s)) in case of a surprisingly bad signal. If on the other hand our
overreaction measure is smaller than 0 we observe underreaction. If misreaction in our
experiment is not systematic we should find that it should cancel out on average.4 We
are going to describe the data generating process, the experimental procedure and the
calculation of the rational benchmark in more detail in the following subsections.
3.2 Basic Design
The experiment consists of three main parts: an instruction phase, a trading phase, and
a questionnaire. The instruction phase allows subjects to get familiar with the trading
environment and to gain experience with the trading mechanism. It also gives subjects
information about the payoff structure.
The trading phase consists of a sequence of 8 consecutive rounds. At the beginning of each
round subjects were shown a graph illustrating the stock price movement of two related
stocks G and H for the last 6 months. Subjects were told that stock price changes of both
stocks at a given day i in trading round j depend upon a firm specific shock ηHi,j (for
stock H) and ηGi,j (for stock G) and upon an industry shock i,j which is common to both
stocks. Moreover, subjects knew that these daily shocks are i.i.d., normally distributed,
4In contrast to Biais et al. (2008) we do not use Overreaction-Beta as additional measure of overreaction in this study.
Since Overreaction-Beta is simply defined as the coefficient of a simple ordinary least squares regression of forecasting error
onto signal for each person it is not really applicable to use it in our market design as subjects have traded only with 8
different stocks and we would need to base our analyses on regression coefficients that are based on 8 observations.
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and stationary over time.5 Then subjects were asked to provide three estimates for the
price of stock H at time t = 12: a best guess as well as a lower and an upper bound. They
were told to set the lower (upper) bound so that the price of stock H at time t = 12 would
fall below (be above) the bound with a very low probability of 5%. Figure 1 illustrates
the computer screen in the estimation task.
Insert figure 1 here
After having provided these three values subjects received an initial endowment of 1,500
monetary units and 5 shares of stock H and were allowed to start trading the stock with
all other market participants for 120 seconds. Trading took place in a single-unit open-
book double auction market similar to the market experiments of Plott and Sunder (1982
and 1988) and Weber and Welfens (2007). After 120 seconds trading was stopped and
subjects received the stock price development of the related stock G for the second 6
months as an additional information. Incorporating this new information or signal, they
were asked again to provide a best guess as well as a lower and upper bound for the price
of stock H at time t = 12. Having provided these estimates the trading floor opened again
and subjects could trade with each other for further 120 seconds. Figure 2 illustrates the
computer screen of the trading market for the second period of a round.
Insert figure 2 here
After further 120 seconds the trading floor closed for a second time and subjects were
informed about the realized price of stock H at time t = 12, the round ended and the
next round started. Thus, in each trading round the trading floor is open for overall four
minutes, two minutes before signal revelation and two minutes after signal revelation. Note
that the 2·2 minute trading periods are exactly the same as the ones in Weber and Welfens
(2007). Moreover, other studies that analyze the existence of individual biases in market
settings also use two minute (Gillette et al. (1999)), three minute (Camerer (1987)), and
four minute (Camerer (1987), Camerer et al. (1989), and Lei et al. (2001)) trading periods.
Since some of these studies show that individual biases are reduced substantially by market
5The simulation of the price paths was similar to the one in Biais et al. (2008). The only difference was that instead of
using daily shocks with a mean of 0.025 we use daily shocks with no trend, i.e. a mean of 0.
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forces the length of our periods should be sufficient to offer the possibility of learning in
our experimental design as well. Figure 3 summarizes the course of an experimental round.
Insert figure 3 here
Subjects know that the true price of stock H at the end of each round is determined by
the sum of all daily firm H specific shocks and all industry shocks that are common to
both firms in each graph. Using Bayesian updating subjects have all necessary information
to calculate the conditional expected value of stock H at time t = 12 (trading day 252)
in round j as well as the variance given a particular signal s explicitly. The signal in
this case is simply the stock price development of the related stock (G) in the second 6
months which is given to subjects before the second turn of trading. Hence, the conditional
expectation follows:
E(v˜Hi,j | s) = vHi,j + E
∑ ·[(˜i,j)] + 1
2
· s (4)
Using the conditional expectation in equation 4 we can calculate the level of overreaction
for each stock price forecast and each transaction price by plugging it into equation 3.
Subjects in our market are informed about the exact underlying process that generates
stock prices and they see the entire order book with all purchase and sell orders as well
as past transaction prices. Own orders are illustrated in red whereas orders from all other
subjects are illustrated in black. Purchase orders in the experimental markets require
that a subject has enough monetary units to pay the specified price as we did not allow
for any short sales. Selling orders only enter the order book if a subject holds a positive
number of shares. In addition, subjects can not submit a selling order which is below their
own already existing purchasing order or set a purchasing order which is above their own
already existing selling order.
Since our experimental market is a single-unit open-book double auction market subjects
can only place one selling order and one purchasing order at a time. If subjects already
have a purchasing (selling) order in the books, they can replace it by entering a new
purchasing (selling) order. Market clearing happens automatically and in continuous time
and transaction prices are always equal to the price of the more senior order. To control
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for order effects the order in which various stocks appear is varied over different markets.
After having finished all 8 rounds of trading with two trading periods each, a questionnaire
starts automatically. In the questionnaire we elicit demographics such as age, gender, and
line of studies.
3.3 Procedure and Descriptive Statistics
The experiment was programmed in Java and run at the University of Mannheim in
November 2008. In 11 of overall 13 session we had 8 students who made up one market
whereas in the other two sessions we had 6 and 7 students, respectively. Since Lei et al.
(2001) and Noussair et al. (2008) also have markets with varying numbers of participants
(6-8) we carry out the analyses for all 13 sessions. However, our results remain stable if
we exclude the two sessions with less than 8 subjects.
Thus, we had a total of 101 students, 51 male and 50 female, who participated in our
experiments. In every session we had 8 rounds of trading, each with two 120-second
trading periods which gives us a total of 208 trading periods or 416 minutes of trading.6
The average age of all subjects was 24.7 and approximately one half of the participants
studied economics or business administration. The average processing time for the whole
experiment including the instruction phase, the trading phase, and the questionnaire was
80 minutes.
Subjects’ payment was determined as follows: subjects received a flat payment of 4 Euro
for filling out the questionnaire and a variable, performance based payment for their par-
ticipation in the 8 rounds of the experimental market. More specifically, the performance
based payment was equal to 0.06% of the overall final wealth for all 8 rounds. The final
wealth at the end of a single round was simply the amount of monetary units at the end of
the round plus the number of stocks held multiplied with the realized value of the stock.
Earnings averaged 13.35 Euro per subject.
Overall, we observe 4,157 buy orders and 4,282 sell orders with a total of 2,063 transac-
6In pre-tests with more than 8 rounds of two 120-second trading periods subjects indicated to us that the task was to
strenuous and advised us to reduce the number of rounds. Moreover, the number of rounds is close to the one in various
other studies such as Sarin and Weber (1993, 2 and 8 rounds) or Weber and Welfens (2007, 10 rounds).
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tions. Interestingly, the number of trades in the first trading period of a round, i.e. before
subjects received a signal, is substantially higher than the number of trades in the second
trading period of a round, i.e. after subjects received the signal. In the first part of a round
1,194 transactions were conducted whereas in the second part of a round only 869 trans-
actions were completed. These findings are in line with Weber and Welfens (2007) who
also find substantially lower levels of trading after a fundamental shock. These numbers
point out to a high trading volume of 11.5 transactions in the first 120-second trading
period of a round, i.e. before a signal, and 8.4 transactions in the latter 120 seconds, i.e.
after the signal was received.
Moreover, we find that the number of shares held by subjects at the end of a period varies
substantially from a low of 0 to a high of 23. Hence, similar to other experimental asset
markets (such as Plott and Sunder, 1982 and 1988 and Weber and Welfens, 2007), these
findings are a first indication for relatively high levels of trading volume.
4 Results
4.1 Existence of Overreaction
The first goal of the market experiment was to detect the level of overreaction in individual
stock forecasts and aggregate market prices with a design similar to Thomas and Zhang
(2008) and Biais et al. (2008). Since we want to analyze the level of overreaction to a given
signal we can only use observations from the second trading period of a round, i.e. from
the period where subjects know the stock price of the related stock G for the entire time
period. In order to analyze overreaction in stock forecasts of all traders we compute their
overreaction score using equation 3 and plug in their best guess as forecasts F. Similar to
Biais et al. (2008) we find overreaction to the signal about a related stock on an individual
level in our experimental markets.
The upper graph in figure 4 illustrates the distribution of overreaction scores in stock
forecasts for each stock and subject separately. Both the median (0.35) and the mean
(0.41) score are significantly larger than zero, indicating substantial levels of overreaction.
However, there is substantial variation in the level of overreaction in our sample with the
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scores ranging from -1.5 to 3.2. In other words, for a majority of 599 observations we find
forecasts indicating overreaction, but for 195 forecasts we also observe underreaction.7
The middle graph in figure 4 shows the average overreaction score in forecasts for each
person. Interestingly, mean (0.41) and median (0.41) overreaction are in the same range
as for each stock separately. However, almost all subjects tend to overreact on average
with only 6 out of 101 subjects having a mean overreaction score of less than 0. This
finding is a first hint that the level of overreaction varies heavily over different rounds but
that there is a general and highly significant (p < 0.01) tendency for overreaction (more
details on this issue will follow later in this subsection).
Analyzing the level of overreaction in market prices, a similar picture arises with a mean
overreaction score in prices of 0.42 and a median score of 0.32. The lower graph in figure
4 illustrates the level of overreaction in market prices. We find that a large majority of
637 transactions are conducted at overreacting prices whereas only 232 transactions are
conducted at underreacting prices. Using a Wilcoxon signed-rank test and a t-test we
find that overreaction in prices is significantly larger than 0 (p < 0.01). However, both
tests implicitly assume that transaction prices are independent. This is not the case as our
experimental market is a single-unit open-book double auction market where subjects can
repeatedly buy and sell the asset. To control for this we analyze the level of overreaction
only for the first transaction in each trading period after subjects received a signal which
gives us a total of 104 observations (13 sessions · 8 rounds). The mean (median) level
of overreaction for the first transaction in each trading period is 0.43 (0.30) which is
significantly larger than 0. In addition, a Mann-Whitney rank-sum test shows that the
level of overreaction for the first transactions is not substantially different from the level
of all other transactions (p = 0.85).
Another problem for the interpretation of overreaction in transaction prices might be
the existence of short selling constraints. For example, after a good signal subjects who
overreact are willing to buy the stock at prices which are too high whereas subjects who
react rationally are not able to drive the market prices down to the rational level by
selling more than their five inventory stocks at seemingly inflated prices. We control for
7Keep in mind that both overreaction in forecasts and overreaction in prices can only be calculated for the second two
minute trading period in each round, i.e. after the signal was revealed.
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the short selling problem using two approaches: first, similar to the non-independency
problem above, we show that overreaction for the first transaction in each trading period
is not smaller than for all observations (p = 0.85). The fact that the short selling constraint
is not binding in the first transaction after a signal revelation and that overreaction is
still present is a first indication that without short selling constraints overreaction would
not abate. Second, we exclude all markets in which at least one subject hits the boundary
and ends up with 0 assets in his / her portfolio. Analyzing the level of overreaction for
markets where the short selling constraint is not binding we find a significantly positive
mean overreaction score in prices of 0.5 and a median score of 0.41. A Mann-Whitney
rank-sum test shows that the level of overreaction in prices is even larger than the level of
overreaction in markets where the short selling constraint is binding (p < 0.01). Thus, we
believe that short selling constraints cannot explain the substantial levels of overreaction
in our markets.
Overall, both overreaction in forecasts and in prices are in the same ballpark as the level
of overreaction in Biais et al. (2008) who find average median overreaction scores of 0.33
and 0.37. Similar to their results, we also observe large heterogeneity of overreaction, with
some subjects providing almost rational estimates and trading at rational prices but with
a majority of subjects overreacting to the new information. Moreover, our results support
empirical findings on overreaction in Thomas and Zhang (2008) in a clean experimental
design, where we can control for other possible explanations. Thus, both hypothesis 1a
and hypothesis 1b are supported by our results.
Insert figure 4 here
Next, we turn to hypothesis 1c and analyze whether market forces help reducing the
level of misreaction, i.e. over- or underreaction. Figure 5 illustrates the median level of
misreaction in forecasts and market prices for each stock separately. Comparing the level
of misreaction in forecasts and prices for each stock separately we find that self-regulating
forces of the market do not seem to help in lowering misreaction of subjects. For 7 out of
8 stocks median misreaction in prices is even larger than the median misreaction in stock
forecasts. Thus, the standard argument that self-regulating forces of markets will correct
for erroneous individual beliefs and hence result in less overreaction does not apply in our
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experimental market. We have illustrated previously, that there is a large heterogeneity
of overreaction with some subjects having almost perfectly rational expectations. Thus,
we can rule out the argument that market forces do not help in lowering the individual
bias due to the fact that there are no traders in the market with rational expectations.
This finding is in line with Gillette et al. (1999) who show for a different kind of task
that individual misreaction in a continuous double auction market is slightly smaller than
aggregate market misreaction which supports hypothesis 1c.
In the following we want to analyze in more detail why market forces or more specifically
traders with rational estimates fail to lower misreaction. The first 3 columns of table 1 show
the median overreaction score in stock forecasts of subjects who bought stocks (Median−
ORBuyer), subjects who sold stocks (Median − ORSeller), and all subjects, regardless
whether they traded the stock or not (Median−ORAll), for each stock separately. Column
4 shows the median overreaction score derived from prices (Median − ORPrices) broken
down by stocks. The results confirm our previous assumption that the level of overreaction
varies heavily with the stock analyzed. For most stocks subjects tend to overreact to
the signal, however, for two stocks (stock 3 and 5) most subjects show the tendency to
underreact.8
The results in table 1 also suggest that some sort of “winner’s curse” might explain the
finding that misreaction in market prices is not smaller than misreaction in forecasts. For
stocks with a good signal which are marked by a + sign in table 1, buyers are excessively
optimistic and keep prices too high whereas for stocks with a bad signal which are marked
by a − sign in table 1, sellers are excessively pessimistic and keep prices too low. In other
words, after good signals buyers heavily overreact and are willing to pay a price which is
8We try to analyze why overreaction is present for some stocks and why underreaction is present for some other stocks.
As we varied the order in which stocks were presented, ordering effects cannot explain our finding. According to Griffin
and Tversky (1992) subjects should overreact to signals with high strength and low weight and underreact to signals with
low strength and high weight. In our experimental setup the weight of a signal is fixed due to the fact that the stock prices
depend upon a common industry shock and the correlation between the two prices should be 0.5 on average. The strength
of a signal is equal to the percentage change in the stock price of stock G. Hence, overreaction should be higher the more
extreme and lower the less extreme the signal is. However, our results show that for the two stocks with the lowest (stock 1)
and the highest (stock 8) signal the level of overreaction is somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, even if we assume that
the weight is not fixed but is inferred from the correlation between the two stocks in the graph the pattern of overreaction
and underreaction cannot be explained by differences in signal strength and weight. Thus, further research is required to
analyze what factors influence the level of overreaction and underreaction exactly.
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way above the rational benchmark and even above the average forecast whereas after a
bad signal sellers heavily overreact and are willing to sell at a price which is way below
the rational benchmark and even below the average forecast. Thus, buyers - after a good
signal - and sellers - after a bad signal - suffer from what we call a “winner’s curse” and
cause transactions to be executed at overreacting prices.
Insert figure 5 here
Insert table 1 here
4.2 Learning to Overreact Less
In addition to finding evidence for the existence of individual and market overreaction
we are interested in analyzing the effects of overreaction in the long-run. More precisely,
we would like to know if subjects are able to learn to overreact less with more trading
experience. Subjects gain trading experience in two ways: first, within the course of a
round as they are able to learn from the bids and asks of other subjects and second, over
rounds as they receive outcome feedback at the end of each round. In the following, we
will first analyze learning within a round and then learning over rounds.
Figure 6 shows the average (upper graph) and the median (lower graph) overreaction
scores for each trading second in the second trading period of a round. To measure whether
there is a learning effect within a round we estimate a simple partial adjustment model
similar to the one in Camerer (1987), Camerer et al. (1989), and Weber and Welfens
(2007):
ORt = α + β ·ORt−1 (5)
Hence, we calculate the level of average overreaction in second t as a function of average
overreaction in the previous second. As also can be seen in the graphs there are hardly any
learning effects and the level of overreaction remains fairly stable over time. Moreover,
in line with Camerer (1987) we estimate the degree of equilibrium bias OREquilibrium
consistently by the estimator OˆR = αˆ
(1−βˆ) , where αˆ and βˆ denote ordinary least squares
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estimators of α and β from equation 5. Fitting with an ordinary least squares regression
results in αˆ = 0.456 and βˆ = −0.112 with βˆ not being significantly different from 0.
Furthermore, the equilibrium bias OˆR = αˆ
(1−βˆ) = 0.41 and thus substantially larger than
0.
To analyze findings on learning within a round in more depth we split the 120-second
trading period into six 20 seconds intervals and calculate three overreaction scores for each
interval separately. Table 2 reports OverreactionMean and OverreactionMedian which are
simply the mean and median overreaction in each time span and OverreactionProportion
which is the proportion of transactions that were carried out at overreacting prices in
a given time span. A series of binomial tests which analyzes whether most transactions
were carried out at overreacting prices indicates that overreaction is prevalent in each
time interval. The same results emerge if we use Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
Moreover, the numbers in the respective time intervals seem to be very similar and closely
related. Using a series of Mann-Whitney rank-sum test we find that no single difference
between two time spans is significant indicating that learning effects are hardly existent
within a round and that the level of overreaction is stable over time. Hence, we do not
observe any learning effects within a round, consistent with hypothesis 2a.9
Besides learning within a round subjects could also gain experience over the course of the
experiment and learn from the outcome feedback that is provided to them. For a more
detailed test, we report means and medians of overreaction as well as the proportion of
overreacting forecasts or transactions for each trading round in table 3. Looking at the
results we find very large differences between single rounds10, however, we are not able to
detect a significant trend. Our results that overreaction does not disappear with learning
effects are stable even if we control for financial expertise which is proxied by the number
of finance courses a subject attended or other demographic variables.
Overall, the findings in this subsection confirm our hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c. Overreaction
remains stable even though subjects acquire more experience and have the possibility to
learn both from the actions of other subjects and from outcome feedback. This is in
9Our results remain stable if we split the 120-second trading period in 3, 4, or 10 time spans of equal length.
10Note, that we control for order effects by varying the sequence in which graphs were presented.
22
line with results in Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) who show that overreaction in the
coin-spin scenario is present even if subjects receive extensive training. It is also in line
with findings in Bloomfield et al. (2000) and Kraemer and Weber (2004) who show that
expertise is of no help in lowering overreaction. Similarly, Benson and O¨nkal (1992) and
Goodwin et al. (2004) point out that outcome feedback is hardly effective at reducing
biases. Moreover, the results in Thomas and Zhang (2008) who analyze a similar setting
to ours empirically also suggests that this kind of overreaction to earnings announcements
of related firms is a stable construct in real-world markets.
Insert figure 6 here
Insert table 2 here
Insert table 3 here
4.3 Differences of Opinion and Trading Volume
As reported in subsection 3.3 subjects seem to be engaged in relatively high levels of
trading volume with on average 9.9 transaction in each 120-second trading period. In
this experimental setup two testable explanations for the observed high trading volume
can be brought forward: first, differences in risk attitudes between traders and second,
heterogenous beliefs about the value of a stock, i.e. differences of opinion.
To show whether trading volume can be explained by risk sharing motives we compare the
trading volume, i.e. the number of shares traded, in each trading period with the level of
differences in risk attitudes between buyer and seller (Differences Risk AversionMaxMin).
Risk Aversion was simply measured for each person on a five point Likert scale with
the endpoints “1 = high risk aversion” and “5 = very low risk aversion”. Differ-
ences Risk AversionMaxMin is simply defined as the difference between the most risk
averse and the least risk averse subject in each session.11 Running a clustered least square
11Alternatively, we also compute Differences Risk AversionStd. which is the standard deviation of all subjects’ risk
attitude measures in each session and relate it to the varying measures of differences of opinion. The results of the following
analyses are essentially the same.
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regression of the level of trading volume on the differences in risk attitudes between the
two traders we are not able to find a significant effect. Differences in risk attitudes cannot
explain the observed high levels of trading volume (see regression 1 in table 4).
The second argument that is often brought forward to explain high levels of trading
are differences of opinion. Amongst others, Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993) or
Kandel and Pearson (1995) propose that excessive trading volume can be explained by
heterogenous beliefs among market participants. Since we elicited beliefs of all market
participants in each period in the estimation phases we are able to analyze this theoretical
proposition in our experimental setup.
Using forecasts (best guesses) that were submitted by all subjects in the estimation part
of the experiment before each 120-second trading period we construct three distinct differ-
ences of opinion measures. Our first measure (Differences of OpinionMaxMin) is simply
the difference between the most optimistic, i.e. highest best guess, and the most pes-
simistic, i.e. lowest best guess, in each 120-second trading period. The second measure
is the standard deviation of all subjects’ best guesses (Differences of OpinionStd) before
each 120-second trading period (see Morse et al. (1991) and Bamber et al. (1997)). Our last
measure of differences of opinion, Change in Dispersion, is also adopted from Bamber
et al. (1997). It measures the change in the standard deviation of forecasts in each trading
round before and after signal revelation. More specifically, it is defined as the standard
deviation of beliefs in the second trading period of a round minus the standard deviation
of beliefs in the previous 120-second trading period of a round. For the first two measures
we have 208 different observations (13 sessions · 8 rounds · 2 trading periods per round)
and for the third measure we have 104 observations (13 sessions · 8 rounds).
The upper graph in figure 7 illustrates the relation between Differences of OpinionMaxMin
and the number of shares traded in each of the 208 periods. The fitted line of a clus-
tered least square regression and the positive Spearman correlation of 0.23 (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: p < 0.01) are a first indication that trading volume is positively re-
lated to differences of opinion. A similar picture emerges if we take a look at the mid-
dle graph in figure 7. Differences of OpinionStd is positively related to trading volume
(Spearman’s rho = 0.21 and p < 0.01). The lower graph in figure 7 illustrates the
relation between Change in Dispersion and Change in shares traded. The variable
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Change in shares traded is defined as the relation between the number of shares traded
in the second period of a round (i.e. after signal revelation), divided by the number of
shares traded in the first period of a round. Similar to the results in the two upper graphs
we observe a positive relation (Spearman’s rho = 0.20 and p = 0.04).
However, one problem of correlation analysis is that we cannot account for non-
independent residuals over sessions. Hence, we additionally run ordinary least squares
regressions in which we cluster our observations over sessions for each difference of
opinion measure separately and additionally control for differences in risk attitudes.
The result in equation (2) supports our graphical findings as the coefficient of Differ-
ences of OpinionMaxMin is significantly positive. If the difference between the most op-
timistic and the most pessimistic forecast is 50, then the number of shares traded in a
market rises by 2.45 compared to a market with perfectly homogenous beliefs. Interest-
ingly, Differences Risk AversionMaxMin cannot explain trading volume. Similar results
emerge if we analyze the relation between Differences of OpinionStd and trading volume.
Our second measure of difference of opinion is also positively related to the number of
shares traded in each period.
Regression (4) in table 4 analyzes the relation between Change in Dispersion and the
change in the number of shares traded in the second period of a round compared to
the first period of a round. Since we only have one observation for each round the
number of observations drops to 104 (13 sessions · 8 rounds). The positive coefficient
of Change in Dispersion indicates that the larger the standard deviation in forecasts
in the second period of a round, compared to the first one, the larger the fraction of
shares traded in the second period of a round compared to the first one. Again, Differ-
ences Risk AversionMaxMin are not able to explain trading volume.
Overall, the findings on the positive relation between differences of opinion and trading
volume are consistent with first experimental evidence in simple 2-subject call markets
(see Hales (2009)) and support our hypothesis 3. Interestingly, not the differences in
risk attitudes but solely the differences of opinions are significantly related to trading
volume. In addition, one could argue that finding evidence on the theoretically proposed
relationship between differences of opinion and trading volume is a further indication that
our data seems to be quite reasonable.
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Insert figure 7 here
Insert table 4 here
5 Conclusion
This paper extends the individual-level-study by Biais et al. (2008) to a simple experi-
mental trading market. We analyze if subjects are able to update their beliefs according
to Bayes rule or if they misreact when they receive new information about a stock and
consequently if market prices overreact. Consistent with findings in Biais et al. (2008)
subjects in our setting overreact to new information on an individual level. Additionally,
we find evidence for aggregate overreaction in market prices, consistent with Thomas and
Zhang (2008). Interestingly, consistent with propositions in theoretical models (e.g. Odean
(1998b) and Biais and Weber (2007)) and findings in the experimental literature (Gillette
et al. (1999)) individual misreaction translates into market outcomes as misreaction in
transaction prices is not lower than in individual estimates.
Furthermore, we analyze if overreaction both on an individual and market level diminishes
over time, i.e. if subjects are able to learn from the actions of other subjects or from the
outcomes in previous rounds. Our results indicate that learning effects can neither be
observed within a two minute trading period nor over various rounds. Hence, overreaction
in this setting seems to be a stable construct. This finding is consistent with Offerman
and Sonnemans (2004) who illustrate individual overreaction to be persistent in their
coin-spin design even though subjects receive extensive training. In addition, evidence in
psychology indicates that outcome feedback, exactly the sort of feedback subjects receive
in our experiment, is not very effective at reducing biases (Benson and O¨nkal (1992) and
Goodwin et al. (2004)).
Lastly, we are able to provide experimental evidence for a positive relation between dif-
ferences of opinion and trading volume. Although theoretical evidence on this relation
is prevalent (Varian (1989), Harris and Raviv (1993), and Kandel and Pearson (1995))
empirical and experimental studies have mainly ignored this relation. A notable exception
is the study by Hales (2009) who shows that trading volume is larger if two traders receive
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more differing signals in a simple two-trader call market. We extend his findings to a more
realistic environment by showing that trading volume is also larger if the disagreement
about future stock price among all market participants is larger in a continuous auction
market.
Further research should analyze if different sorts of feedback, such as cognitive or task
information feedback, could help in lowering both individual and market biases. Previous
findings on the role of different sorts of feedback on the level of overconfidence has shown
that in particular outcome feedback is not helpful in lowering biases. In addition, it could
be fruitful to study the high differences in the level of overreaction between stocks in
more detail. Varying the degree of signal strength and weight or the length of the fore-
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Table 1: Misreaction in prices vs. misreaction in forecasts
Column (1) to (3) of this table report the median overreaction scores in the forecasting task for buyers
(Median−ORBuyer), sellers (Median−ORSeller), and all subjects in the market (Median−ORAll) separately
for each stock. Column (4) reports the median overreaction score in transaction prices (Median − ORPrice)
separately for each stock. + (−) signs in the first column indicate that subjects received a good (bad) signal.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Stock Median−ORBuyer Median−ORAll Median−ORSeller Median−ORPrice
1+ 0.377 0.123 0.123 0.174
2− 0.317 0.317 0.485 0.400
3− -0.206 -0.011 0.072 -0.178
4+ 1.290 1.290 1.290 1.189
5+ 0.110 -0.070 -0.162 -0.089
6− 0.165 0.286 0.527 0.527
7+ 1.072 1.072 1.072 1.239
8+ 0.315 0.315 0.315 0.334
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Table 2: Learning within a round
This table reports mean (OverreactionMean) and median (OverreactionMedian) overreaction scores in trans-
action prices as well as the proportion of transactions at overreacting prices for six time intervals of twenty
seconds. Overreaction is calculated for every transaction separately and afterwards aggregated for each twenty
seconds trading period.
Seconds OverreactionMean OverreactionMedian OverreactionProportion
-120 to -101 0.354 0.296 68.14
-100 to -81 0.451 0.315 71.85
-80 to -61 0.411 0.322 69.33
-60 to -41 0.429 0.325 77.27
-40 to -21 0.403 0.315 75.17
-20 to -0 0.454 0.372 76.16
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Table 3: Learning over rounds
This table reports mean and median overreaction scores in forecasts (OREstimates) and transaction prices
(ORPrices) as well as the proportion of overreacting forecasts and prices for each trading round separately.
OREstimates ORPrices
Mean Median Prop. Mean Median Prop.
Round 1 0.256 0.315 78 0.088 0.296 70.71
Round 2 0.567 0.485 79 0.702 0.485 91.76
Round 3 0.076 0.072 59 0.134 0.045 54.62
Round 4 0.673 0.712 76 0.724 0.547 83.05
Round 5 0.503 0.292 67 0.270 -0.071 40.35
Round 6 0.145 0.165 73 0.116 0.021 56.47
Round 7 0.757 0.678 89 0.937 0.906 99.07
Round 8 0.353 0.377 79 0.384 0.377 88.73
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Table 4: Trading volume and differences of opinion vs. differences in risk attitudes
This table presents results on the relation between trading volume and differences of opinion as well as
differences in risk attitudes using clustered least squares regressions (number of clusters is equal to 13). Trading
volume in regressions (1) to (3) is simply the number of shares traded and in regression (4) the relation of
shares traded in the second 120 trading seconds of a round divided by the number of shares traded in the first
120 trading seconds of a round. Our first measure of differences of opinion is Differences of OpinionMaxMin
which is simply the difference between the most optimistic and the most pessimistic forecast in each 120-
second trading period. Differences of OpinionStd is simply the standard deviation of all forecasts in each
120-second trading period. Change in Dispersion is defined as the difference in the variation of expectations
between the second and the first 120-second trading period in each round. Changes in the level of risk aversion
Differences Risk AversionMaxMin are simply the difference between the most risk averse and least risk
averse subject in each trading market. We report regression coefficients and p-values in parentheses.* indicates
significance at the 10% level, ** indicates significance at the 5% level, and *** indicates significance at the
1% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Shares traded Shares traded Shares traded Change in shares traded
Differences of OpinionMaxMin 0.049
(0.002)***
Differences of OpinionStd 0.128
(0.003)***
Change in Dispersion 0.017
(0.003)***
Differences Risk AversionMaxMin 1.541 1.494 1.496 0.101
(0.157) (0.163) (0.173) (0.145)
Constant 6.600 4.566 4.768 0.602
(0.011)** (0.058)* (0.056)* (0.002)***
Observations 208 208 208 104
Adjusted R-squared 0.058 0.093 0.082 0.083
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Figure 1: Estimation screen
The figure illustrates the screen of the estimation task in the first period of round 2. In the upper
left-hand part the price development for the two stocks G and H in the first 6 months is displayed. In
the three white boxes below the graph subjects can submit their three estimates (lower bound, best
guess, and upper bound) for the price of stock H at t = 12. The remaining time for this task is shown in
the upper right-hand part. The trading boxes on the right-hand side of the graph are in the estimation
task inactive and are going to be explained in the following.
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Figure 2: Trading screen
The figure illustrates the screen of the trading task in the second period of round 2. In the upper
left-hand part the price development for stock H in the first 6 months and the price development of
stock G over all 12 months is displayed. The three estimation boxes are inactive and the values subjects
had previously submitted are not shown anymore. The trading boxes on the right-hand side are
activated and show all selling offers, purchasing offers, and the last transaction prices. Purchasing offers
are sorted highest to lowest, selling offers lowest to highest, and transaction prices are sorted by time. A
subject’s own selling or purchasing orders are illustrated in red whereas all remaining orders are
displayed in black. To submit an order subject’s simply had to type in a price and click on the button
“Submit a selling order” and “Submit a purchasing order”, respectively.
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Value of stock H is randomly drawn and 
determines final payoff
Subjects are shown initial graph of two 
stocks (G & H) and asked to provide 
forecasts for stock H
Initial endowment of 5 H stocks and 
1500 monetary units
Two minutes of trading stock H
New information about stock G appears 
in the market. Subjects are asked to 
update forecasts for stock H
Two minutes of trading stock H
Figure 3: Course of the experiment
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Figure 4: Overreaction histograms
The figure shows the level of overall overreaction in stock forecasts (upper graph), the level of average
overreaction for each person in stock forecasts (middle graph), and the level of overreaction in market
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Figure 5: Overreaction prices vs. overreaction forecasts
The figure illustrates the level of overreaction in transaction prices (OR - Price) and in estimates (OR -
Estimate) for all 8 stocks separately. A positive value on the y-axis indicates overreaction whereas a
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Figure 6: Learning within a round
The upper graph shows average overreaction scores in transaction prices over all rounds and the lower























0 50 100 150
Differences of Opinion (MaxMin)





















0 10 20 30 40
Differences of opinion (Std)
























−20 −10 0 10 20
Change in dispersion
Change shares traded by round Fitted values
Figure 7: Differences of Opinion and Trading Volume
The two upper graphs illustrate the relation between number of shares that were traded in each
120-second trading period and two distinct measures for differences of opinion. The differences of
opinion measure in the upper graph is simply the absolute difference between the most optimistic
forecast and the most pessimistic forecast of subjects (Differences of Opinion (MaxMin)) in each
120-second trading period. Similarly, the differences of opinion measure in the middle graph is the
standard deviation of all forecasts (Differences of Opinion (Std.)) in each 120-second trading period.
The lower graph illustrates for each session and stock separately, how a change in the variation of
expectations (Change in Dispersion) is related to a change in trading volume.
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